

Walter Schultz, Ph.D.
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add: **(Criterion II)** *God's ultimate end in creation must (i) be inherently valuable, and (ii) valued inherently by God, (iii) before creation, and (iv) capable of being achieved by creating.* (from A1, T1, OUE = _{dit})

Chapter Two: **An exposition and logical analysis of the Introduction to Jonathan Edwards' *End of Creation***

Jonathan Edwards' *Two Dissertations: I. Concerning the End for which God created the world. II. The nature of True Virtue* was published in 1765 seven years after his death. The preface, written by his friend Samuel Hopkins, begins with these informative words:

The author had designed these dissertations for the public view; and wrote them out as they now appear: though 'tis probable that if his life had been spared, he would have revised them, and rendered them in some respects more complete. Some new sentiments, here and there, might probably have been added; and some passages brightened with further illustrations. This may be conjectured from some brief hints, or sentiments minuted down, on loose papers, found in the manuscripts.

But those sentiments concisely sketched out, which 'tis thought, the author intended to enlarge and digest into the body of the work, cannot be so amplified by any other hand as to do justice to the author: 'tis therefore probably best that nothing of this kind should be attempted.

Samuel Hopkins, along with Joseph Bellamy, first encountered this work when Edwards' read it to them in February, 1756. As Hopkins wrote in his diary for February 12, "Mr. Bellamy came to my house last Tuesday, with whom I went to Stockbridge and stayed there two nights and one day, to hear Mr. Edwards read a treatise on 'The Last End of God in the Creation of the World.'" One can easily imagine the conversation and the listener's desire that "some passages [be] brightened with further illustrations". The "loose papers found in the manuscript" are long

lost, and so both the *Introduction* and first chapter remain among the most impenetrable works of philosophy.

The Introduction comprise only twenty-six paragraphs. This paragraph-by-paragraph analysis is intended to establish that Edwards' *Introduction* is indeed one valid argument.¹ For the sake of ease we have numbered each paragraph and refer to them using brackets, e.g., [1]. It looks as though Edwards was convinced that such inquiries had already been confused and misleading due to their failing to be as precise and thorough in the use of *end* as the topic required. The simple distinction between subordinate and ultimate ends was too crude, in Edwards's opinion, to represent God's purposeful actions and too crude to enable a resolution to Spinoza's charge of incoherence in the doctrine of God. The way to avoid these "confusions" is, first, to recognize that a purposeful agent can pursue different kinds of ultimate ends. Edwards says that his *Introduction* is an "explanation of terms and positions." An adequately defined concept of *end* that includes motivational components is what is "explained" in this *Introduction*. Edwards begins his clarifying project, first, by making a distinction between a chief end and an ultimate end. A chief end is a type of ultimate end, but not every ultimate end is a chief end. This distinction is just one of several refinements and clarifications he makes until he reaches the concept of an ultimate end that he thinks most aptly applies to God: an *original* ultimate end which are motivated by some *disposition* characterizing the agent. He needs convincingly to justify each these further refinements and not simply to invent what he needs by conceptual fiat.

He is following the general procedure for "demonstrations" as Arnauld and other logicians had taught. Thus, given his educational background, it seems that we should look for two types of claims that would parallel the Euclidean pattern, *definitions* and *theorems*. We might expect terms to be defined and positions to be derived. However, it is difficult to discern just what he intends a "position" to be. Beginning at paragraph [10] he introduces nine numbered claims by indicating that what follows are things to be "observed". These seem to be significant enough to warrant our taking them to be 'positions'. However, they seem not to share an easily identifiable common characteristic. Some are postulates; some are propositions (theorems). Even so, we know that he is refining the concept of an *ultimate end* and then applying the

¹ **Research:** Was the *Introduction* added last? Note McClymond, Holmes, and others.

concept to God, because *God has an ultimate end in creation* is a shared assumption. Thus, we seem entitled to treat the numbered claims to be demonstrated or established “positions” –objectives to be secured—so as to be convincing and clear about how to understand the shared assumption. Though modeled on the Euclidean pattern, the *Introduction* does not merely define and postulate, it *argues* for some of the definitions and their application to “the end for which God created the world.”

Edwards intends to refine the concept, *ultimate end* by an analysis of the general idea of an agent acting for an end. He then applies the analysis to “the end for which God created the world.” He begins in [1] by noting that *chief* ends differ from *ultimate* ends. In paragraphs [2] - [6] he contrasts each type with its opposite. Chief ends are opposite *inferior* ends; ultimate ends are opposite *subordinate* ends. He directly explains the distinction between *chief* and *ultimate* in [7]-[9]. Then, in [10]-[14], he explains *ultimate end* in light of this distinction.

Positions One and Two relate the distinction to *subordinate ends* in [10] and [11]. Position Three relates the distinction to *supreme* and *last* ends in [12] - [14]. Paragraph [14] contains the first application of the refined concept to God. Positions Four and Five in [16] and [17] introduce the motivational component of an ultimate end in the form of a disposition, while paragraphs [18] - [24] introduce a new distinction between *original ultimate ends* and *consequential ultimate ends*, based on these motivational aspects and then apply these to God. The motivational aspects are dispositional properties (or dispositions). His final refinement of the concept of an ultimate end, therefore, depends on the concept of a disposition. Positions Six and Seven in [23] and [24] are further applications of the concept to God. These are the crucial “propositions” of *Introduction* found in [18] as two aspects of Position Five:

1. The *end* for which God created the world must be an *original ultimate end*.
2. God is *motivated* to seek his end in creation by virtue of some *disposition*.

The last sentence of Position Seven in addition to Positions Eight and Nine in [25] and [26] indicate how to use propositions to ascertain the content of God’s end in creating.

In short, the *Introduction* has this logical structure: the definitions, postulates, common notions, and the assumption that there is an end for which God created the world entail that it is an original ultimate end and some disposition characterizing God himself moved him to

create. Everyone agreed that *God has an ultimate end in creation* and that *God is infinite and perfect*. With these distinctions and deductions in hand, he demonstrates in chapter one that, since God is infinitely valuable before the creation of the world, *God* (in some sense) must himself be God's ultimate end in creation and that God's infinite self-love (a second-order attribute) is also the *disposition* that moved him to create and governs all that he does.

Notes on the logical analysis

Edwards's *terms* are defined and each *position* is either derived (i.e., a *Euclidean* proposition) or asserted on empirical grounds (i.e., like a *Euclidean* postulate). The validity of his argumentation also involves an implicit role for some conceptual truths (i.e., *Euclidean* common notions). To better explicate Edwards's argumentation, each paragraph is numbered. Then, its ideas are distilled and their role in the argument is identified, that is, either as a *definition* (D), *postulate* (Post), *common notion* (CN), or *proposition* (Prop). Finally, each notion that plays a role in the larger argument is formalized in first-order logic.

While Edwards' argumentation involves properties of properties as well as modalities, making second-order modal logic the required system for a precise and complete logical analysis, we may simplify things considerably by using first-order logic and discussing the few issues of modality and second order predicates as they arise.

A logical analysis involves providing and *interpretation structure* (or *model*) \mathcal{M} which consists of a *set* of objects \mathcal{D} called the *domain of discourse* (or domain of the interpretation) and an *interpretation function* \mathcal{I} which assigns objects and sets of objects in \mathcal{D} to the terms and predicates of the specified language \mathcal{L} .

Domain of discourse. Edwards begins by generalizing over agents, their ends and their dispositions. That is, before he applies his concepts to God, he establishes them as holding for agents, ends and dispositions in general. The objects in the *Domain of Discourse* are the *ends* and the *dispositions* of any single agent. The protocol for giving interpretations in standard first-order logic requires that each of these must fall under a sortal predicate. One picks out the kind using a predicate, then attributes a property (kind or relation) using a different predicate. To minimize the symbolism, we may instead stipulate that all predicates are assumed to be about ends, except one relational predicate involves a named disposition. Therefore, for what follows, we should understand every claim to be prefixed by "For any agent S and end

x'' (unless, of course, the claim is about God explicitly or a particular disposition). Observing this will simply matters considerably.

Exposition and Logical Analyses

[1] TO avoid all confusion in our inquiries and reasonings, concerning the end for which God created the world, a distinction should be observed between the *chief* end for which an agent or efficient **exerts any act** and **performs any work**, and the ultimate end. These two phrases are not always precisely of the same signification : and tho' the *chief* end be always an *ultimate* end, yet every ultimate end is not always a chief end.

There are two implicit assumptions in this first paragraph. The first is that *God has an ultimate end in creating the world*. The definite article, 'the', and the singular term, 'end', suggest *only one* end, but later he seems to admit the possibility of *more than one*. Either way, the title of the dissertation presupposes that God has *at least one* ultimate end. Since Edwards does not treat it explicitly as a Euclidean postulate, let us treat it as an implicit shared assumption. The second implicit assumption has to do with the nature of an end. Although he never defines an end *per se*, we may gather from the work that an *end* is a state of affairs which some agent S intends to achieve and sometimes sustain by acting. He adds more to the basic implied definition in the next paragraph. Since these "inquiries and reasonings" concern the end *for which* God created the world, we have this implicit postulate:

Pst 0 **Creation is a means to God's ultimate end.** (Implicit in the title)

$$U_{\Delta} \wedge Bc \wedge Mc_{\Delta}$$

We also have the following from [1]:

[1] **Pst1** **Every chief end is an ultimate end.** [1]

$$\forall x(Cx \rightarrow Ux)$$

Prop1 **Not every ultimate end is a chief end.** [1]

$$\sim \forall x(Ux \rightarrow Cx) \quad (\quad)$$

(Formal proofs for these and all other propositions on the basis of the definitions, postulates and common notions are provided in the Appendix. The notation in the parentheses indicate the logical

grounds of the proposition.)

[2] A chief end is opposite to an inferior end : An ultimate end, is opposite to a subordinate end. A subordinate end is something that an agent **seeks** and **aims at** in what he does ; but yet don't *seek* it, or *regard* it at all upon its own account, but wholly on the account of a further end, or in order to some other thing, which it is considered as a means of. Thus when a man that goes a journey to obtain a medicine to cure him of some disease, and restore his health, — the obtaining that medicine is his subordinate end ; because 'tis not an end that he *seeks* for itself, or *values* at all upon its own account ; but wholly as a means of a further end, viz. his health : Separate the medicine from that further end, and it is *esteemed* good for nothing ; nor is it at all *desired*.

Again, just to keep the idea in the forefront of our thinking, his central aim in this introduction is to refine the received concept of an ultimate end and derive several truths about God's purposeful actions. Edwards continues by developing the distinction introduced in [1]. We are given two more propositions.

[2] **Prop2 A chief end is opposite to an inferior end.** [2]

$\forall x(Cx \leftrightarrow \sim Ix)$ ()

Prop3 An ultimate end is opposite to a subordinate end. [2]

$\forall x(Ux \leftrightarrow \sim Bx)$ ()

He then defines the notion of a "subordinate end" and, in so doing, introduces aspects or dimensions of ends in general that will serve to make further distinctions. Keeping in mind that an end is a state of affairs to be achieved by acting, we see in this paragraph that a person may seek to achieve it either *for its own sake* or *as a means* to some other end. Call this the *relative instrumentality* of the *practical dimension* of the concept of an end. As we shall see, the distinction between an ultimate end *per se* and a subordinate end has to do with whether they are a means to another end or not. Edwards also introduces a *valuational dimension*.² The difference between the *practical dimension* and the *valuational dimension* is signaled by the disjunctive phrases, "seek or regard" and "seeks or values". The second term of each pair, 'regard' and 'values', denotes the

² As we shall see, they both have to do with *valuing* as the distinguishing aspect of the *chief/inferior* distinction.

valuational dimension. We see all of this most clearly in his last sentence where he not only emphasizes the valuational dimension, but also seems to distinguish two ways of valuing: cognitively and affectively. The phrase, “esteemed good for nothing” seems to indicate that a kind of *cognitive appraisal* has taken place. The phrase “desired” indicates that a kind of *emotional* or *passional* attitude is taken toward that end. Although it is far from obvious from these terms alone that he intends these two ways of valuing, he nevertheless makes use of them later and this distinction becomes more explicit and crucial in his overall argumentation. Furthermore, each of these ways of *valuing* an end (i.e, cognitively and the affectively) is either *inherently* or *derivatively*. Call this the *relative intrinsicity* of the *valuational* dimensions. In other words, what we have so far in the implicit concept of an end is this:

Every end *x* is a state of affairs that an agent *S* seeks to achieve either *for itself* or *as a means* to another end, and values to some extent (cognitively and affectively) either *inherently* or *derivatively*.

There is no need to treat this as a definition because its disjunctive features are given alternatively in latter definitions. Thus, an end, insofar as it is *subordinate*, is such that the agent (1) *seeks* it as a *means*, not for itself, and (2) *values* it as being *derivatively*, not inherently valuable.

D1 A subordinate end is a means to some other end and its value depends entirely on the value of that end. [2]

$$\forall x(Bx \leftrightarrow \exists y(Mxy \wedge Nxy))$$

By this definition, Edwards does not mean that there are only two basic types of ends: subordinate or ultimate. Rather, he is only taking the next step in a method of analysis which refines a concept by making distinctions in stages.

Also two important common notions are brought into play. Although he does not mention them, he uses them.

CN1 An end is a means to another if and only if the latter is not a means to the former. [2]

$$\forall x \forall y (Mxy \leftrightarrow \sim Myx)$$

CN2 An end is sought for its own sake if and only if there is no end to which it is a means. [2]

$$\forall x \forall y (Sx \leftrightarrow \sim \exists y Mxy)$$

Having noted these, we will see that Edwards is not always careful to distinguish the two ways of valuing. At times, he seems to indicate that an agent *seeks* an end and simply *values* it. Even so, the distinction between two types of valuing is intended and comes up again in the next paragraph.

[3] AN ultimate end is that which the agent seeks in what he does, for its own sake : That he has respect to, as what he loves, values and takes pleasure in on its own account, and not merely as a means of a further end : As when a man loves the taste of some particular sort of fruit, and is at pains and cost to obtain it, for the sake of *the pleasure of* that taste, which he values upon its own account, as he loves his own pleasure ; and not merely for the sake of any other good, which he supposes his enjoying that pleasure will be the means of.

In this paragraph, Edwards seems merely to reiterate the content of the commonly-held concept of an *ultimate end*. However, in addition to the practical aspect of an end, Edwards also mentions the two sides of the valuational dimension by his use of the phrase, “loves, values and takes pleasure in”. That is, in addition to an ultimate end’s being something that an agent (1) *seeks* for itself, not as a means (practical), that agent also (2) *appraises* it as being inherently, not derivatively, valuable (evaluative), and (3) *esteems* it accordingly (affective or passionate). The words, ‘values’ and ‘loves’ convey the latter two features. Although Edwards’ words do not seem univocally and clearly to indicate these additional features of ultimate ends, Edwards does intend them as we shall see.

There is more here. In addition to *seeks* and *values* (in both senses) an agent *takes pleasure in* the achievement of purposes. In paragraphs [2] through [12], every illustration of an ultimate end includes the notion of *enjoyment* or *taking pleasure in*, so this is an aspect of the very notion of an ultimate end. That is, what is sought for its own sake is the *enjoyment* or *pleasure* in its realization. It is a state of felicity, pleasure, gratification, satisfaction, enjoyment or fulfillment in something’s being the case; some state’s having been achieved. Therefore, an agent’s ultimate end *e* is not constituted solely by some state of affairs σ , but rather it always involves *the enjoyment of* σ . Thus, an ultimate end *e* just is *the enjoyment of, pleasure in, or satisfaction and fulfillment from* some state of affairs σ . This is what the agent *seeks* (practical dimension), *appraises* as valuable (cognitive dimension) and *desires* (passion dimension).

As Edwards’s *Misc.* 1182 and *Misc.* 1218 indicate, the state achieved and sustained is a state of being *gratified* in σ . It is the enjoyment of σ , the pleasure of σ , not σ *per se*. As we shall see there is a close relationship between this and an agent’s loving, desiring, being passionate for the achievement of some end. Moreover, that an agent gets pleasure or enjoyment in the achieving or achievement of some end *explains* his desire for it. What is not mentioned, but tacitly assumed, is that every ultimate end is so valued *before* an agent considers any means. This must be included.

These features of all ultimate ends – the relative *practical/instrumental*, the dual valuation dimension and the *pleasure* feature of ultimate ends – these features all play a role in Edwards’s argumentation. However, we need not differentiate the two aspects of the valuational dimension here, because while they play a role in *Chapter One* – indicating there that he intended them here – only the combined concept, *values*, plays a role here in the *Introduction*. We may put the content of [3] in this way:

An end, insofar as it is *ultimate* includes the *pleasure, enjoyment* or *satisfaction* obtained in the achieving / achievement of some state of affairs and, as such, all ultimate ends are (1) (occurrently) valued *inherently*, not derivatively, and (2) sought *for their own sakes* and (3) not as a means to other ends. [3]

We have the following *definition* and formalization:

[3] **D2** **An end, insofar as it is *ultimate* is (1) (occurrently) valued *inherently*, not derivatively, and (2) sought *for their own sakes* and (3) not as a means to other ends.**

$\forall x(Ux \leftrightarrow (Vx \wedge Sx \wedge \sim \exists yMxy))$ [3]

This definition plays a crucial role in Edwards’ argumentation. But there is more to the concept. The fully explicated *concept* of an *ultimate end* as it appears in the title of the work is this:

1. It involves a concrete state of affairs which some agent intends to achieve and sometimes sustain by acting, and
2. *S* seeks *e* for *itself*, not as a means, and
3. *S* appraises *e* as being *inherently*, not derivatively, valuable, and
4. *S* esteems *e* in *itself*, and not as derived, and
5. *e* always includes the *pleasure, enjoyment* or *satisfaction* obtained in the achieving / achievement of σ , and
6. *e* is such that its agent is motivated to seek and occurrently to value it by virtue of some disposition and [*e* is dispositionally, then occurrently agreeable to *S*]
7. *S*’s valuing (i.e, appraising and esteeming *e*) is *occurrent* prior to the consideration of any means for achieving it. [*e* is occurrently agreeable to *S* *before* even thinking of any means to achieve it.]

This is simply a more precise analysis of the common notion of a person’s acting purposefully than was captured in the discussions and treatises by their use of the term, ‘ultimate’. A very important consequence is that when this content is applied to God, the end FOR which God created the world, is God. It is both a concrete state of affairs, God’s exercising his power to realize an aspect of his

eternal awareness, and then sharing or extending his intra-Trinitarian life to the redeemed in that setting, which is all for his own sake, even though the redeemed benefit. We find this use in Burgersdyck.

Aspect (1) is a background assumption about ends and plays no other distinct role in the argument. Aspects (2) - (4) are captured by D2 $\forall x(Ux \leftrightarrow (Vx \wedge Sx \wedge \sim \exists y Mxy))$ and are used often, but the argumentation in the Introduction does not make use of the two types of valuing. The two types of valuing appear in the argumentation of Chapter One. Aspect (5) is given in [3] and [5] and, though not used in argument in the Introduction, it appears in Chapter One. Aspects (6) $\forall x(Ux \rightarrow Dx)$ and (7) CN13 $\forall x(Ux \rightarrow (\forall y(Myx \rightarrow x < y)))$ are given in [16] and [18]. Aspect (6) follows from D2 and Pst 7.

CN3 If an end is occurrently inherently valued by S, then it is not a means to another end.

$$\forall x(Vx \leftrightarrow \sim \exists y Mxy)$$

CN4 If an end is (1) (occurrently) valued *inherently*, not derivatively, and (2) sought for its sake, then its value does not depend on the value of another end.

$$\forall x(Vx \wedge Sx) \leftrightarrow \sim \exists y Nxy)$$

Paragraphs [3] through [14] explain what is meant by “end” as it appears in the title. Paragraphs [16]- [26] are observations and applications regarding the refined concept.

[4] SOME ends are subordinate ends, not only as they are subordinated to an ultimate end ; but also to another end that is itself but a subordinate end : Yea, there may be a succession or chain of many subordinate ends, one dependent on another, — one **sought** for another : The first for the next ; and that for the sake of the next to that, — and so on in a long series before you come to any thing, that the agent **aims at** and **seeks** for its own sake : — As when a man sells a garment to get money — to buy tools — to till his land — to obtain a crop — to supply him with food — to gratify the appetite. And he **seeks** to gratify his appetite, on its own account, as what is **grateful** in itself. Here the end of his selling his garment, is to get money ; but getting money is only a subordinate end : 'Tis not only subordinate to the last end, his gratifying his appetite ; but to a nearer end, viz. his buying husbandry tools : And his obtaining these, is only a subordinate end, being only for the sake of tilling land : And the tillage of land, is an end not **sought** on its own account, but for the sake of the crop to be produced : And the crop produced, is not an ultimate, or an end **sought** for itself, but only for the sake of making bread : And the having bread, is not **sought** on its own account, but for the

sake of gratifying the appetite.

The paragraph relates subordinate ends to ultimate ends. In addition, given the nature of subordinate ends and what we will learn about the scriptural representation of God actions, a “chain” of ends” needs to be introduced and defined.

[4] **Pst2 For every subordinate end there is an ultimate end to which it is a means. [4]**

$$\forall x(Bx \leftrightarrow (\exists y Uy \rightarrow Mxy))$$

Pst3 Some subordinate ends are means to other subordinate ends. [4]

$$\exists x \exists y (Bx \wedge By \wedge Mxy)$$

D3 A chain of ends is a sequence of ends ending with one ultimate end. [4]

$$\forall x(Hx \leftrightarrow \exists y \exists z (By \wedge Bz \wedge \exists !u (Uu \wedge (Myu \vee (Mzu \wedge Myz))))))$$

Even though he doesn't use the terms, Edwards describes both “trees” of ends and “branches”. Each branch is a sequence or chain. Tree branch and branches branch. Later, he uses the term, “work”, to denote a “tree” of ends. A work may have more than one ultimate end. Hence, as we proceed, let us assume for each formalization, that only one chain is involved unless otherwise specified. By definition (D4) the last “link” in every chain is one ultimate end.

Finally, we should take note that Edwards's use of the word, ‘may’, is subtle. He is not making modal claims about God or about agents' purposeful action in general, as if to say, “It is possible for God . . .” Rather, there are two meanings. The first is involved in his giving examples to illustrate a point (as is the case in this paragraph). Such examples are hypothetical regarding the facts. The second use of ‘may’ signifies the application of the definitions and their logical consequences to God.³ In other words, he is in effect claiming, “Reason permits us to apply these results to God.” Edwards' *Introduction* is a conditional proof. Thus, the use of ‘may’ is hypothetical in a logically conditional sense: “Given the shared assumption that God has an ultimate end in creation and the reasonableness of these definitions, postulates and their logical consequences, these apply to God as follows.”

[5] HERE the gratifying the appetite, is called the ultimate end ; because 'tis the last in the chain, where a man's aim and **pursuit** stops and rests, obtaining in that, the thing finally **aimed** at. So whenever a man comes to that in which his desire terminates and rests, it being something **valued** on its own account, then he comes to an ultimate end, let the chain be longer or shorter ; yea, if there be but one link

³ See paragraph [19].

or one step that he takes before he comes to this end. As when a man that **loves** honey puts it into his mouth, for the sake of the pleasure of the taste, without aiming at anything further. So that an end which an agent has in view, may be both his immediate and his ultimate end ; his next and his last end. That end which is sought for the sake of itself, and not for the sake of a further end, is an ultimate end ; it is ultimate or last, as it has no other beyond it, for whose sake it is, it being for the sake of itself : So that here, the **aim** of the agent stops and rests (without going further) being come to the good which he esteems a recompense of its pursuit for its own value.

The idea of a “last end” is the next step in Edwards’s refinement and development of an adequate concept of an ultimate end. It is the final “link in a chain” or terminating point in a tree. This yields a definition, a proposition, presupposes another common notion and entails a corollary.

[5] **D4 A last end is the final link in a chain of ends.** [5]

$$\forall x(Lx \leftrightarrow \sim \exists yMxy)$$

Prop4 Every end valued and sought for its own sake and not for the sake of something else is an ultimate end and a last end. [5]

$$\forall x ((\forall x \wedge Sx \wedge \sim \exists yMxy) \leftrightarrow (Ux \wedge Lx)) \quad (\quad)$$

CN5 If an end is instrumental to another, then there is a chain and both ends are links in it. [5]

$$\forall x \forall y(Mxy \rightarrow \exists z(Hz \wedge Lxz \wedge Lyz))$$

Corol. 1 Every ultimate end is a last end and every last end is an ultimate end. [5]

$$\forall x (Ux \leftrightarrow Lx) \quad (\quad)$$

Here again, he includes the *affective valuational* component of an ultimate end, by his use of ‘esteem’ and ‘desire’ and he reiterates that *pleasure in σ* is an essential aspect of every ultimate end. It is worth emphasizing again that ultimate ends are states of affairs to be achieved which are *appraised* and *esteemed* as valuable in themselves, not merely *sought* for themselves.

[6] HERE it is to be noted, that a thing **sought** may have the nature of an ultimate, and also of a subordinate end, as it may be **sought** partly on its own account, and partly for the sake of a further end. Thus a man in what he does, may **seek** the love and respect of a particular person, partly on its own account, because ‘tis in itself **agreeable** to men to be the objects of others’ esteem and love : And partly,

because he hopes, through the friendship of that person, to have his assistance in other affairs ; and so to be put under advantage for obtaining further ends.

He seems here to be calling to attention an important characteristic of complex rational action. Some ends have dual natures of one of three types: ultimate/subordinate, subordinate/subordinate or original/original. We must remember to distinguish between trees and branches to avoid the contradictions that may result from “nodes” having dual nature. It seems only to create a problem when the notion of a chief end is involved. Adding the relational predicates, M^2 and L^2 , might seem to be sufficient to prevent deductions that lead to contradictions. However, maybe these need to be ternary predicates, indicating whether the chain is a branch or the trunk. Or we could add a unary predicate for branch and a definition of branch. Then, when necessary, use a conditional, “If x is a branch . . .” and “only if x is a branch.” Nevertheless, I don’t think we need to do this, given our purposes. That is, we need not represent Edwards’s presentation in every detail, but only enough of it to see the line of logical dependence.

[6] Some ends may be partly ultimate and partly subordinate.

In paragraphs [7]-[9] Edwards explains (Prop2) *Not every ultimate end is a chief end*. Let us recount the progression so far. From the broad category of *ultimate* ends, he first separates out (and lets stand without further comment) the sub-category, *chief* ends. He then turns back to *subordinate* ends (which are “opposite ultimate end *per se*), shows how they combine to form *chains* of ends and how there can be *dual-natured* ends, which are nodes where “works” may “branch” off. Whenever a work branches, it will have more than one *ultimate* end, it will have more than one *chief* end *relative to branches*. This brings him back to *chief* ends so as to continue the process of refinement.

[7] A chief end or highest end, which is opposite not properly to a subordinate end, but to an inferior end, is something diverse from an ultimate end. The chief end is an end that is **most valued** ; and therefore most **sought** after by the agent in what he does. ‘Tis evident, that to be an end **more valued** than another end, is not exactly the **same thing as** to be an end valued ultimately, or for its own sake.

To further the process of refinement, Edwards draws our attention to a simple observation that some ultimate ends may be *more valuable* to an agent than other ultimate ends and *being more valuable* is not the same property as *being valued for its own sake*. With this in mind, he characterizes a chief end as *most valued*. So far he has devoted attention to the *practical* dimension. Here he begins to emphasize the *valuational* dimension. He begins by reiterating what he claimed in paragraph [1] and then completes the definition of a “chief end”: it is *most valued* and this differs

from being intrinsically valued. (Though we cannot distinguish here whether Edwards intends such valuing to be understood to include both the cognitive and the affective, we are entitled to assume that he has it in mind, since he later does establish the distinction.) Furthermore, since an ultimate end is always a last end, it must be the *most valued end in that "branch"*, even if it is not the most valued in the entire work or "tree". So it must be *a* chief end, even if it is not *the* chief end. Making room for chief ends *relative to a branch* of subordinate ends does not impugn or undermine the concept of *the* chief end.

The observation that *being more valuable* is not the same property as *being valued for its own sake* highlight a relation between properties of ends. It is a *second-order* relation. But we need not formalize it, because we can capture the concept in first-order logic with appropriate definitions. We have these additional definitions and common notions.

[7] D5 **A chief (supreme) end is the most valued end in a work.** [7] **A chief end is the most valued in a chain of ends.**[7]

$$\forall x(Cx \leftrightarrow \forall yPxy) \qquad \forall x(Cx \leftrightarrow \exists y(Hy \wedge Lxy \wedge \forall z(Lzy \rightarrow Pxy)))$$

D6 **An inferior end is less valued than some other end.**[7]

$$\forall x(Ix \leftrightarrow \exists yPyx)$$

CN6 **An end is more valued than another if and only if it is false that the second is more valued than or equally valued with the first.**[7]

$$\forall x\forall y(Pxy \leftrightarrow \sim Pyx)$$

CN7 **If two ends are equally valued, then neither is more valued than the other.**[7]

$$\forall x\forall y((x \approx y \rightarrow \sim(Pxy \vee Pyx))$$

CN8 **If one end is more valued than another, they are not identical.**[7]

$$\forall x\forall y(Pxy \rightarrow x \neq y)$$

This will appear, if it be considered.

[8] 1. THAT **two different ends may be both ultimate ends, and yet not be chief ends.** They may be both **valued** for their own sake, and both **sought** in the same work or acts, and yet one valued more highly and sought more than another : Thus a man may go a journey to obtain two different benefits or enjoyments, both which may be **agreeable to** him in themselves considered, and so both may be what he values on their own account and seeks for their own sake ; And yet one may be much more **agreeable** than the other : And so be what he sets his heart chiefly upon, and seeks most after in his going a journey. Thus a man may go a

journey partly to obtain the possession and enjoyment of a bride that is very dear to him, and partly to gratify his curiosity in looking in a telescope, or some new-invented and extraordinary optic glass : Both may be ends he seeks in his journey, and the one not properly subordinate or in order to another. One may not depend on another ; and therefore both may be ultimate ends : But yet the obtaining his beloved bride may be his chief end, and the benefit of the optic glass, his inferior end. The former may be what he sets his heart vastly most upon ; and so be properly the chief end of his journey.

The sentence that introduces paragraph [8] is crucial. It tells us that he will introduce two examples that will make clear the idea that *being more valuable* is not the same property as *being valued for its own sake* (which, in turn, is meant to support (Prop2) *Not every ultimate end is a chief end*). First of all, when works of agents involve more than one ultimate end *per se*, one can be *more* valuable, rendering one other *most* valuable.

[8] **Pst4 If one ultimate end is more valued than another in a work, it is a chief end.**[8]

$$\exists x \forall y ((Ux \wedge Uy \wedge Pxy)$$

[9] 2. **AN ultimate end is not always the chief end,** because some subordinate ends may be more valued and sought after than some ultimate ends. Thus for instance, a man may aim at these two things in his going a journey ; one may be to visit his friends, and another to receive a great estate or a large sum of money that lies ready for him, at the place to which he is going. The latter, viz. his receiving the sum of money may be but a subordinate end : He may not value the silver and gold on their own account, but only for pleasure, gratification, and honor ; that is the ultimate end, and not the money which is valued only as a means of the other. But yet the obtaining the money, may be what is more valued, and so an higher end of his journey, than the pleasure of seeing his friends ; tho' the latter is what is valued on its own account, and so is an ultimate end.

In the first sentence, he repeats the content of [1], that there is a division within the category of *ultimate ends* due to the possibility that one ultimate end may be *more valued* than another ultimate. Here he gives a second example in which *some subordinate ends are more valued than some ultimate ends in a work*. But this is not a postulate, because he will make this precise in [10].

[9] **Some subordinate ends are more valued than some ultimate ends in a work.**[9]

BUT here several things may be noted :

[10] FIRST, That when it is said, that some subordinate ends may be more valued than some ultimate ends, 'tis **not supposed that ever a subordinate end is more valued than that ultimate end or ends to which it is subordinate** ; because a subordinate end **has no value**, but what it derives from its ultimate end : For that reason it is called a subordinate end, because it **is valued** and sought, not for its own sake, or **its own value**, but only in subordination to a further end, or for the sake of the ultimate end that it is in order to. **But yet a subordinate end may be valued more than some other ultimate end that it is not subordinate to**, but is independent of it, and don't belong to that series, or chain of ends. Thus for instance : If a man goes a journey to receive a sum of money, not at all as an ultimate end, or because he has any **value for** the silver and gold for their own sake, but only for **the value of** the pleasure and honor that the money may be a means of. In this case it is impossible that the subordinate end, viz. his having the money should be **more valued** by him than the pleasure and honor, for which **he values it**. It would be absurd to suppose that he **values** the means more than the end, when he has no **value for** the means but for the sake of the end, of which it is the means : But yet he may **value** the money, tho' but a subordinate end, more than some other ultimate end, to which it is not subordinate, and with which it has no connection. For instance, more than the comfort of a friendly visit ; which was one ultimate end of his journey.

He qualifies what he said in [9] with following postulate which is his first "position":

General Positions

[10] Pst5 [POSITION ONE] **Some subordinate ends are more valued than an ultimate end to which it is not a means.** [10]

$$\exists x(Bx \wedge \exists y (Uy \wedge \sim Mxy \wedge Pxy))$$

From here to the end of the *Introduction* he is qualifying, refining and developing what he has so far established about there being further distinctions to notice in the concept of an ultimate end. He is numbering the items to be observed. These numbered claims seem to be the "positions" he intends to establish either by postulating them or by deriving them. They are pertinent to his overall argument. POSITION ONE is a postulate. Its importance—its being called a "Position"—seems to lie in the fact that God's work in creation and redemption has several branches. This can serve to identify those ultimate, but less valued, ends that others may have mistakenly treated as "the end for which God created the world."

[11] SECONDLY, Not only is a subordinate end never superior to that ultimate

end to which it is subordinate ; but **the ultimate end is always (not only equal but) superior to its subordinate end**, and **more valued** by the agent ; **unless it be when the ultimate end entirely depends on the subordinate** : So that he has no other means by which to obtain his last end, and also is looked upon as certainly connected with it, — then the subordinate may be **as much valued** as the last end ; because the last end, in such a case, does altogether depend upon, and is wholly and certainly conveyed by it. As for instance, if a pregnant woman has a peculiar appetite to a certain rare fruit that is to be found only in the garden of a particular friend of hers, at a distance ; and she goes a journey to her friend’s house or garden, to obtain that fruit — the ultimate end of her journey, is to gratify that strong appetite : The obtaining that fruit, is the subordinate end of it. If she looks upon it, that the appetite can be gratified by no other means than the obtaining that fruit ; and that it will certainly be gratified if she obtains it, then she will **value** the fruit as much as she **values** the gratification of her appetite. But otherwise, it will not be so : If she be doubtful whether that fruit will satisfy her craving, then she will not **value it** equally with the gratification of her appetite itself ; or if there be some other fruit that she knows of, that will gratify her desire, at least in part ; which she can obtain without such inconvenience or trouble as shall countervail the gratification ; which is in effect, frustrating her of her last end, because her last end is the pleasure of gratifying her appetite, without any trouble that shall countervail, and in effect destroy it. Or if it be so, that her appetite cannot be gratified without this fruit, nor yet with it alone, without something else to be compounded with it, — then her **value for** her last end will be divided between these several ingredients as so many subordinate, and no one alone will be **equally valued** with the last end.

The proviso, “unless it entirely, and without possibility of failure, depends on them,” deserves extended attention. First of all, it primarily serves further to justify the distinction between *ultimate* ends *per se* and those that are *chief*. When the claim with the proviso is applied to God, it suggests that God may have had other — not merely feasible ends (given his omnipotence) — but “really” possible courses of action (sequences of subordinate ends or possible worlds) as means to his end in creation. That is, the proviso applied to God suggests that God really could have done everything differently. This is something that Edwards seems not to countenance. For Edwards, only one ultimate end could have been pursued by God (even though others may have been feasible) and Christ’s sufferings are indispensable. [Misc. 702, p.297,8; others] In other words, if this is applied to God, it would suggest that other entirely different courses of action — other sequences of subordinate ends were viable options for God, then he will have to say that Christ need not have suffered in order to achieve God’s ultimate purpose. Again, there is evidence that I don’t think he

wants to do that. Christ's sufferings in Edwards's opinion were not optional, though they in one sense are subordinate. By [POSITION TWO], Christ's sufferings are equally valued with God's ultimate end in creation. Nevertheless, Christ's sufferings do not play a role in Edwards's *philosophical* argument for God's end in creation. So, as a matter of policy for the sake of simplicity, I will note this proviso in parentheses without formalizing it.⁴

[11] Pst6 [POSITION TWO] **An ultimate end is more valued than any of its subordinate ends**
 (unless for any one of them there is no alternative). [11]
 $\forall x(Ux \rightarrow \forall y(Myx \rightarrow Pxy))$

[12] HENCE it rarely happens among mankind, that a subordinate end is equally valued with its last end ; because the obtaining of a last end rarely depends on one single, uncompounded means, and is infallibly connected with that means : Therefore, men's last ends are commonly their highest ends.

[12] **Since a person's last ends seldom depend only and obviously on one subordinate end or chain of such ends, that person's last ends are usually their most valued ends.**

[13] THIRDLY, If any being has but one ultimate end, in all that he does, and there be a great variety of operations, his *last* end may justly be looked upon as his *supreme* end : For in such a case, every other end but that one, is an end to that end ; and therefore no other end can be superior to it. Because, as was observed before, a subordinate end is never more valued than the end to which it is subordinate.

We may paraphrase the first sentence of [13] as follows: *If an agent has only one course of action or "work" (i.e., having an ultimate end and several subordinate ends), then, by [POSITION ONE] and [POSITION*

⁴ So, it looks as though we need not account for the proviso in the formalization. However, the domain of discourse does not include feasible, but not pursued ends. So, the proviso cannot be captured symbolically unless we extend the domain. The question is whether this proviso plays an essential role in his argumentation. On the surface, it seems not to. So, again, maybe we need not attempt to formalize the concept. Besides, it would complicate the formalizing project significantly to capture this, because if we need to extend the domain, then we need predicates to distinguish possible or feasible ends from actually intended ends. These notions require two different predicates, but they are not logical notions, i.e., they do not involve standard logical possibility. Each subordinate end is a necessary condition (in one sense) of the achievement of an ultimate end.

Two], it is his supreme end.

[13] **Prop5** If an agent has only one ultimate end (i.e., work), then his last end is his supreme end. [13]

$$\exists!xUx \rightarrow \forall y(Ly \rightarrow My) \quad (\quad)$$

$$\text{CN9} \quad \exists!xUx \leftrightarrow \forall y\forall z((Uy \wedge Uz) \rightarrow y = z)$$

Note that this does not rule out the possibility that a subordinate end may be of *equal* value to an ultimate end, because *not being more valued* (“no other end can be superior” and “never more valued”) does not entail *not being equally valued*. A subordinate end is valued equally with its ultimate end when there are no alternatives.

[14] MOREOVER, the subordinate effects, or events or things brought to pass, which all are means of this end, all uniting to contribute their share towards the obtaining the one last end, are very various ; and therefore, by what has been now observed, the ultimate end of all must be valued, more than any one of the particular means. This seems to be the case with the works of God, as may more fully appear in the sequel.

The word, “moreover”, signals an extension, treating each subordinate end as being of some value, but none of equal value to the “one last end”. In other words,

[14] **Lemma** If an agent has only one ultimate end, then his last end is his supreme end and is more valued than any one of its means (unless for any one of them there is no alternative). [14]

$$\exists!x(Ux \rightarrow ((Lx \rightarrow Cx) \wedge \forall y(Myx \rightarrow Pxy))) \quad (\quad)$$

Remember that Edwards is generalizing about agents and actions, even though agents and actions are not specified as such in the domain of discourse. But now he applies the claim to God as a logical consequence of what he has so far. It is not clear whether he intends the proviso to be carried over as well, especially since he does not state it. However, there are good reasons to think that Edwards intends it to be carried over into the application.

Without the proviso, God’s ultimate end would be *more* valuable than any *one* of its subordinate ends means that every subordinate end was dispensable. Therefore, if this were true of God’s ultimate end, Christ’s sufferings were not necessary. But, again, it seems that this conclusion would have been entirely unacceptable to Edwards. Even though it might seem to have been *logically* possible and feasible for God to achieve his original ultimate end without the Fall and

the sufferings of Christ, Edwards would not think was actually the case in God's plan. However, he seems to have committed himself to this in saying, "This (i.e., God's ultimate end being of more value than any of its means) seems to be the case with the works of God." While this claim does not contradict anything *else* he holds in the *Introduction* or in *Chapter One*, it does contradict what he writes in *other* works of his. So we have this:

CN10 If an agent has only one ultimate end, then his last end is his ultimate end.

$$\exists!x(Ux \rightarrow \forall y(Ly \rightarrow y = x))$$

Prop6 [POSITION THREE] If God has only one ultimate end, then his *last* end is his supreme end and is more valued than any of its means (unless for any one of them there is no alternative). [14]

POSITION THREE leaves open the questions of whether God, in fact, has only one ultimate end. If God has only one "work", then he has only one end. If God has more than one ultimate, then there are two ways it can be structured. The first is this: one ultimate is the *chief* ultimate end and at least one other is an *inferior* ultimate end. In this case the *chief* end is still *supreme* and more valued than any other end—including the other ultimate end. The second is this: the "terminating stage" in a work is two ultimate ends of equal value. Each one is achieved by a separate sequence of subordinate ends; each is last in a branch. However, since they are of equal value, then either one is more valued than any *subordinate* end—even one in the other branch.

There is more to be said in favor in POSITION THREE as it stands. POSITION THREE with the proviso provides grounds to argue that God's present state before creation is of at least equal value to his state of achieving his ultimate end. This is the concept that overcomes the *Spinoza Conundrum* which requires the ultimate end to be of greater value than the initial state. Moreover, this does not entail that God "took pleasure" in the sufferings of Christ, but only that he appraised them as having worth and esteemed them accordingly.

[15] FROM what has been said, to explain what is intended by an ultimate end, the following things may be observed concerning ultimate ends in the sense explained.

So, it looks as though in explaining his points, he demonstrates POSITION ONE, TWO and THREE. Now he is going to take note of more things which are either postulates or propositions in a Euclidean sense. The "explanation" he refers to began in [1]. He is refining the notion of an *ultimate end* so as to arrive at a notion faithful to scripture, justified by reason and able to overcome the *Spinoza Conundrum*. As we mentioned after [9], he shifted to a process of qualifying, refining and developing what he had presented and established from [1] - [9].

[16] FOURTHLY, Whatsoever any agent has in view in any thing he does, which he loves, or which is an immediate gratification of any appetite or inclination of nature ; and is agreeable to him in itself, and not merely for the sake of something else, is regarded by that agent as his last end. The same may be said, of avoiding that which is in itself painful or disagreeable : For the avoiding of what is disagreeable is agreeable. This will be evident to any bearing in mind the meaning of the terms. By last end being meant, that which is regarded and sought by an agent, as agreeable or desirable for its own sake ; a subordinate, that which is sought only for the sake of something else. $\forall x(Lx \leftrightarrow ((\forall x \wedge Sx) \wedge \sim \exists y Mxy))$

It is not immediately evident what this paragraph adds. Edwards's general use of the terms, 'values' and 'loves', usually expresses a combination of a cognitive apprehension of real value and of an emotional or passionate attitude that is commensurate with its value. These will play a role in *Chapter One*, but need not be distinguished here. In paragraphs [2] through [12], every illustration of an ultimate end includes the notion of *enjoyment* or *taking pleasure in*, so this is an aspect of the very notion of an ultimate end. That is, what is sought for its own sake is the *enjoyment* or *pleasure* in its realization. It is a state of felicity, pleasure, gratification, satisfaction, enjoyment in something's being the case; some state's having been achieved. Thus, whatever type of experience of pleasure, gratification, or enjoyment for which an agent acts and loves for its own sake, it is regarded by that agent as his last end. This is what he already had in place by [5]. However, with all of this in place, no further distinction can be made to refine the notion of an ultimate end, if all we have available are these components of the refined definition. What [16] adds, then, is the notion of a *disposition*.⁵

Interlude:

As his summary in [16] of the examples given so far indicate, experiences of pleasure in achieving ones' ultimate ends are of two types. That is, what is gratified in the achievement is either an appetite or an inclination. The terms suggest two types of dispositions: what may be called *need* dispositions and *non-need* dispositions.⁶ Some, but not all, dispositions are rooted in what a person needs in order to exist, to function or to be fulfilled. These, in turn, signal *ontological* dependence, basic *functional* dependence and psychological (emotional or overall well-being) *dependence*, respectively.

⁵ See the authors article, *Jonathan Edwards' Concept of an Original Ultimate End*.

⁶ It is apparent that Edwards does not intend by these terms to name two categories of dispositions. He uses them interchangeably. However, he gives examples of both types and therefore seems to intend the two types.

Dispositional properties play a crucial role in the final form of the refinement of the concept of *ultimate end*. They also play a crucial role in the entire *End of Creation* as well as in many other treatises and sermons of Edwards. Although he gives examples of them and how they function in his illustrations, he refers to them for the first time in this work right here in [16]. Their importance merits a careful explication of his concept. As a segue into the discussion, recall that he is refining *ultimate end*. In so doing, he introduces *chief end*, discusses *value*, and now relates these to *disposition*.

There are three paragraphs that contain his direct presentation of dispositions, [16], [18] and [20]. In paragraph [16], for the first time in the work, Edwards connects dispositions (inclinations) to the pursuit of ends.⁷ Edwards's account takes into consideration only *those dispositions that are pertinent to an agent's seeking ends*.

As was mentioned earlier, his summary in [16] of the examples given so far indicate that what is gratified in the achievement is either an *appetite* or an *inclination*. Both are dispositional properties and, although he will later distinguish between types of dispositions, that seems not to be his intent here.

The *grounds* of dispositions are not addressed by Edwards in *End of Creation*, but when applied to God, the answer lies hidden in the nature of God alone as Trinity. Keeping in mind that the dispositions Edwards considers are those that account for an agent's acting purposefully, their *manifestations* always include an agent's (1) taking action toward and (2) enjoyment in the achievement or achieving some state of affairs. If an agent has such a disposition, it manifests in action and enjoyment. Thus, an agent's doing what he or she does is explained (but only in part) by reference to his or her dispositions which are bound up with what he or she takes pleasure in.

An agent seeks to achieve some state *because* he values the pleasure of achieving it, that is, its achievement is agreeable to him in anticipation *and* in actualization. If we know that an agent is pursuing an ultimate end, then we know there is a background disposition. This explanation is legitimate *after* the fact and plays a crucial role in ascertaining God's end in creation. However, to attempt to ascertain (from an agent's valuing the pleasure of something) just *when* he or she will begin the pursuit of that thing is futile. Here is why. To say that an agent values something is to attribute a dispositional property. The agent is, therefore, only *disposed* to pursue the correlative end. Something is needed to *initiate* the disposition so that it *manifests* in occurrent desire and action.

⁷ Throughout this work, Edwards uses the terms, "disposition" and "inclination", synonymously.

There are two additional features to note here. First, a disposition can be an ever-present, even though their respective manifestations seldom are. Therefore, while the dispositions Edwards refers to are abiding or enduring characteristics of agents, they are not continually manifested. The second thing to note is that, for some dispositions, their manifestation includes an occurrent desire for *e* and action toward achieving it. This is a crucial distinction for Edwards. For some dispositions, the occurrent desire (*value* in one sense) for *e* is an aspect of its manifestation; for other dispositions, *value* in the second sense just is a constant feature and characterizes the disposition.

The concept of a disposition is crucial to Edwards's understanding of God's freedom and by extension, crucial to a coherent concept of God. God has no "need" dispositions, given his *aseity* or self-sufficiency. Non-need dispositions may truly characterize an agent, even if they are never manifested. Thus, *God's justice*—that is, love of the satisfaction of doing justice; of justice accomplished—characterized God eternal ages before it was ever manifested.⁸ We will return to this later as we reconstruct his answer to the *Spinoza Conundrum*. For now, this is all we can say about dispositions *per se* from what is given so far. Edwards addresses them again and more completely in [18].

End of interlude.

Bearing in mind the features of dispositional properties, let us restate [16] making the following additions:

[16] FOURTHLY, Whatsoever any agent has in view in any thing he **does**, which he **loves (now desires)** or **(deeper yet)** which is an immediate gratification of any appetite or **inclination** of nature ; and is **(therefore) (dispositionally) agreeable to** him in itself, and not merely for the sake of something else, is regarded by that agent as his last end. The same may be said, of avoiding that which is in itself painful or disagreeable : For the avoiding of what is disagreeable is agreeable. This will be evident to any bearing in mind the meaning of the terms. By **last end** being meant, that which is regarded and **sought** by an agent, as **(occurrently) agreeable or desirable** for its own sake ; a subordinate, that which is sought only for the sake of something else. (emphases added)

Before we turn to [17] and [18], the content of [16] should be distilled and formalized. In [16] he recapitulates what he has from [3] and [5] and introduces the relationship of a disposition.

⁸ As we will see, God's taking pleasure in nothing-based creatures joyfully experiencing Trinitarian self-knowledge, love and joy is the gratification of an inclination that is a perfection, namely, *God's goodness*.

Although dispositional characteristics are not emphasized here in [16], they are introduced somewhat obliquely and receive direct reference and clarification in [18] and [20]. So we have this proposition and correlating postulate from [16]:

[16] **Prop7 [POSITION FOUR] Whatever an agent seeks and values for its own sake is his last end.** [16]

$$\forall x(Lx \leftrightarrow (Sx \wedge \forall x \wedge \sim \exists y Mxy)) \quad (\text{Prop4} \quad)$$

Pst7 If S seeks and desires an end for its own sake, then it is such that its agent is motivated to seek and occurrently to value it by virtue of some disposition.
[16],[18]

$$\forall x((Sx \wedge \forall x \wedge \sim \exists y Mxy) \rightarrow Dx)$$

CN11 An end is such that its agent is motivated to seek and occurrently to value it by virtue some disposition if and only if there is a disposition that causes S to seek and occurrently to value it.

$$\forall x(Dx \leftrightarrow \exists \delta^* D\delta^*x)$$

CN12 An end is such that its agent is motivated to seek and occurrently to value it by virtue some disposition if and only if it is (dispositionally) agreeable to S.

$$\forall x(Dx \leftrightarrow Ax)$$

This paragraph [16] adds ultimate ends are *dispositionally agreeable* to the agent S. His purpose (it seems) is to emphasize it as something to take note of because of its role in the argumentation.

[17] FIFTHLY, From hence it will follow, that, if an agent has in view more things than one that will be brought to pass by what he **does**, that are **(occurrently) agreeable to him**, consider'd in themselves, or what he **loves** and **delights** in on their own account, — then he must have more things than one that he regards as his last ends in what he does. But if there be but one thing that an agent seeks, as the consequence of what he does that is agreeable to him, on its own account, then there can be but one last end which he has in all his actions and operations.

What [17] contributes is an inference:

Therefore,

[17] Prop8 If an agent has more than one end that are valued inherently and sought intrinsically, then he has more than one last end. If an agent has only one such end, then he has only one last end. [17]

A. $\exists x \exists z ((x \neq z \wedge (Sx \wedge \forall x \wedge \sim \exists y Mxy) \wedge (Sz \wedge \forall z \wedge \sim \exists y Mzy)) \rightarrow \exists x \exists z (Lx \wedge Lz \wedge x \neq z))$

B. $\exists! x (Sx \wedge \forall x \wedge \sim \exists y Mxy) \rightarrow \exists! y Ly$ ()

It is important to note two issues pertinent to what follows. The first is that POSITION FIVE is stated in [18]. The second is that POSITION FIVE eventually follows from POSITION FOUR. The point of paragraph [17] is straightforward and establishes one more step: the number of ends *sought, valued* (two senses) and *agreeable* to an agent indicate an equal number of last ends. With this in mind let us examine [18].

[18] BUT only here a **distinction must be observed** of things which may be said to be agreeable to an agent, in themselves consider'd in two senses: (1.) What is in itself grateful to an agent, and valued and loved on its own account, *simply* and *absolutely* considered, and is so universally and originally, antecedent to, and *independent* of all conditions, or any supposition of particular cases and circumstances. And (2.) What may be said to be in itself agreeable to an agent, *hypothetically* and consequentially : Or, on supposition of such and such circumstances, or on the happening of such a particular case. [18] cont'd: **Thus, for instance** : A man may **originally love** society. An **inclination** to society may be implanted in his very nature : And society may be **agreeable** to him **antecedent to** all presupposed cases and circumstances: And **this** may **cause** him to seek a family. And the comfort of society may be **originally** his last end, in seeking a family. But after he has a family, peace, good order and mutual justice and friendship in his family, may be **agreeable** to him, and what he **delights in** for their own sake : and therefore these things may be his last end in many things he does in the government and regulation of his family. But they were not his original end with respect to his family. The (*love of*) justice and the peace of a family was not properly his last end before he had a family, that **induced** him to seek a family, but consequentially. And the case being put of his having a family, then these things wherein the good order and beauty of a family consist, become his last end in many things he does in such circumstances. [18] cont'd: **In like manner we must suppose that God, before he created the world, had some good in view, as a consequence of the world's existence, that was originally agreeable to him in itself considered, that inclined him to create the world, or bring the universe, with various intelligent creatures into existence, in such a manner as he**

created it. But after the world was created, and such and such intelligent creatures actually had existence, in such and such circumstances, then a wise, just regulation of them was agreeable to God, in itself considered. And God's love of justice, and hatred of injustice, would be sufficient in such a case to induce God to deal justly with his creatures, and to prevent all injustice in him towards them. But yet there is **no necessity of supposing**, that God's love of doing justly to intelligent beings, and hatred of the contrary, was what originally induced God to create the world, and make intelligent beings; and so to order the occasion of doing either justly or unjustly. The justice of God's nature makes a just regulation agreeable, and the contrary disagreeable, as there is occasion; the subject being supposed, and the occasion given. **But we must suppose something else that should incline him to create the subjects or order the occasion.**

The central point of paragraph [18] introduces a further distinction among ultimate ends that will eventuate in his refined concept and its application as God's ultimate end.

The phrase, "a disposition that causes S to achieve x" can mean, "is *one* causal factor in S's acting to achieve x" or "is *the* cause of S's acting to achieve x". Dispositions are perfections or characteristics (faithfulness or justice). But then God caused God to act. The latter (in the first sentence) entails compatibilist freedom; the former consistent with libertarian freedom. Compatibilists hold that freedom is compatible with determinism. One's dispositions and current desires are necessary and sufficient for an one's taking an action. However, by saying that God's dispositions caused God to act, Edwards is not analyzable into metaphysical composites. Furthermore, this negative claim does not mean that God is metaphysically simple either. No substantive metaphysical thesis (in this sense) is being made here. So, it is not quite right to conclude that God's freedom is compatibilist in the strict sense of the use of the term. See his *Freedom of the Will*. Edwards is not giving a metaphysical analysis of God. He is reporting in philosophical language the received picture or concept of God. In short, he claims that, since God acts and acts for purposes and from motives, the *most* we can say, given the wide-spread acceptance of revelation and the nature of disposition language, is that *something* moved him to create the world—but it was not a real *need* because God is self-sufficient.

Returning to the discussion of [18], every ultimate end, by definition, is desired. Chief ends differ in that they are *most* desired. The *essential* difference between *original* and *consequential* ultimate ends, then, lies primarily in *when* they are "agreeable to" an agent. If the correlating disposition characterizes the agent essentially or most basically, apart from any environmental factor, actual or imagined— if its manifestation does *not* require the actualization of any such environmental condition, then the end associated with it is an *original* ultimate end, otherwise it is a *consequential* ultimate end. For this latter type, while the correlating disposition characterizes the agent *in one sense* apart from environmental conditions, actual or imagined, its *manifestation* requires

the realization of those conditions.⁹ Thus, we have these definitions:

D7 *An original ultimate end is occurrently agreeable, prior to and independent of the existence or the imagining of any means to it.* [18]

$$\forall x(Ox \leftrightarrow (\exists x \wedge \forall y (Myx \rightarrow x < y)))$$

This definition underscores and presupposes a common understanding of acting for ends.

CN13 *Every ultimate end is occurrently valued before the agent considers any means for achieving it.*

$$\forall x(Ux \rightarrow \forall y(Myx \rightarrow x < y))$$

D8 *A consequential ultimate end is occurrently agreeable only after and dependent on the existence or the imagining of some subordinate end.* [18]

$$\forall x(Nx \leftrightarrow (\exists yOy \wedge \exists zMzy \wedge x > z))$$

It might go without saying that we have another common notion at play here:

CN14 *If an end is occurrently agreeable to S either before or after S seeks or considers any other state, it is occurrently agreeable to S.* [18]

$$\forall x \forall y ((x < y \vee x > y) \rightarrow \forall x)$$

Prop9 [POSITION FIVE] *The end for which God created the world is an original ultimate end and*

God is motivated to seek his end in creation by virtue of some disposition. [18]

$$O_{\Delta} \wedge D_{\Delta} \quad (\quad)$$

Corol2 *God's end in creation was occurrently valuable to God before he even considered creation's existence.*

$$\Delta < C$$

⁹ Evidence that this is the correct interpretation (or something very close to it) lies in Edwards's argument in *Section One of Chapter One*.

Pst 8 Whenever an agent *S* has both an original ultimate end and a consequential ultimate end, the dispositions that cause *S* to achieve them are not identical. [18]

$$\forall x \forall y \exists z \exists u ((Ox \wedge Ny) \rightarrow (Dzx \wedge Duy \rightarrow (z \neq u)))$$

Pst9 Only after the world was created is *justice-accomplished* occurrently agreeable to God for itself and God's love of justice is the disposition that disposition which causes *S* to seek and occurrently to value it.

$$\forall x (((Jx \wedge Vx) \rightarrow j \prec c) \wedge D_j x)$$

(Implicit) Therefore

Prop10 The disposition that moved God to create in the first place it is not identical to any of the dispositions that moved God to achieve any consequential ultimate end. [18]

$$(O_{\Delta} \wedge \forall x D_{x\Delta}) \rightarrow (\forall y (Ny \wedge \forall z D_{zx}) \rightarrow \Delta \neq x)$$

Edwards is claiming that, given the distinction between original and ultimate ends, "it does not follow that" *p*. This is an important milestone. This seems to be one of the claims he needs. What *does* follow is [19]:

[19] **So** that PERFECTION of God which we call his faithfulness, or his INCLINATION to fulfill his promises to his creatures, *could not* properly be WHAT MOVED HIM to create the world; nor could such a fulfillment of his promises to his creatures, be his last end, in giving the creatures being. **But [i.e., and]** yet after the world is created, after intelligent creatures are made, and God has bound himself by promise to them, then that DISPOSITION, which is called his faithfulness, *may* MOVE HIM in his providential disposals towards them: And this may be the end of many of God's works of providence, even the exercise of his faithfulness in fulfilling his promises. And may be in the lower sense his last end. Because faithfulness and **truth** must be supposed to be what is in itself **amiable** to God, and what he delights in for its own sake. Thus God **may** have ends of particular works of providence, which are ultimate ends in a lower sense, which were not ultimate ends of the creation.

The first sentence do with God's dispositions. *God's faithfulness* according to Edwards, it is an "inclination to fulfill his promises." It is an ever present, enduring disposition. The relevant ultimate end is the satisfaction of promises fulfilled. The manifestation of the disposition is (1) an occurrent desire for, (2) taking action toward and (3) eventual enjoyment in promises fulfilled. The

disposition is triggered or activated by some set of circumstances having as background God's binding himself by promising. The point is that here we have an ultimate end, but it is consequential and cannot be "the end for which God created the world". So we have the following:

[19] Prop11 God's faithfulness (i.e., his disposition to fulfill his promises) is not what moved him to create the world, and his fulfilling them is not his ultimate end in creation. [19]

$$\sim Df_{\Delta} \wedge \forall x(Dfx \rightarrow x \neq \Delta)$$

In the phrase, "that disposition, which is called his faithfulness, may move him in his providential disposals towards them," the use of the word, 'may', is subtle. He is not making modal claims about God as if to say, "It is possible that God . . ." Rather, his use of 'may' signifies the application of the definitions and their logical consequences to God. In other words, he is in effect claiming "if these definitions and consequences are accepted, then these follow regarding the application of them to God." The idea is that "perfections" are dispositional characteristics that "move" an agent to action. Again, the crucial difference that Edwards highlights in the definitions is the presence or absence of some "external" precipitating situation which is either a means to or incidental to the agent's original or current ultimate end and cannot be a means to the consequential ultimate end. Here *some situation's requiring providential care in terms of promises made* is a precipitating situation. It arises as a result of the creation and existence of humans, which is a means to God's original ultimate end in creation. *Achieving situations requiring providential care* is not a means to *achieving providential care*, even though *providentially caring as the fulfilling of promises* presupposes the existence of *situations requiring providential care*.

[19] Prop12 If the fulfillment of God's promises is a consequential end and a work of providence, then God's disposition to fulfill his promises (his faithfulness) is what moved him to bring about their fulfillment. [19]

$$\forall x((Fx \wedge Nx) \rightarrow Dfp)$$

Prop13 Therefore, some works of providence are consequential ultimate ends but not God's original ultimate end. [19]

$$\exists x(Rx \wedge Nx \wedge \sim O_x \wedge x \neq \Delta)$$

[20] So that here we have two sorts of ultimate ends ; one of which may be called, original and independent ultimate end ; the other consequential and dependent. For 'tis evident, the latter sort are truly of the nature of ultimate ends : Because tho' their being agreeable to the agent, or the agent's desire of them, be consequential on the existence, or supposition of proper subjects and occasion ; yet the subject

and occasion being supposed, they are agreeable and amiable in themselves. **We may suppose** that to a righteous Being, doing justice between two parties, with whom he is concerned, is agreeable in itself, and is loved for its own sake, and not merely for the sake of some other end : And yet we may suppose, that a desire of doing justice between two parties, may be consequential on the being of those parties, and the occasion given.

[20] **Prop14** *God's justice is the disposition that causes God to do justice, which is a consequential ultimate end.* [20]

$$D\delta_j \wedge N_j \quad (\quad)$$

[21] THEREFORE I make a distinction between an end that in this manner is *consequential*, and a *subordinate* end.

When Edwards says here, "Therefore, I make a distinction. . .", much like modern mathematical practice of stipulating the meaning of a term by the phrase, "Let x be . . .", he is referring to his previous introduction of the term, "consequential ultimate end". His use of 'therefore' lets the reader know that he claims that something follows logically from taking the terms as defined. So, we have this:

[21] **Prop15** *Consequential ultimate ends are distinct from subordinate ends.* [21]

$$\forall x(Nx \leftrightarrow \sim Bx) \quad (\quad)$$

[22] It may be observed, that when I speak of God's ultimate end in the creation of the world, in the following discourse, I commonly mean in that highest sense, viz. the original ultimate end.

Edwards established this in [18]. Paragraph [7] is crucial. He says, "[7] A chief end or highest end, which is opposite not properly to a subordinate end, but to an inferior end, is something diverse from an ultimate end. The chief end is an end that is **most valued** ." Paragraphs [8] and [9] continues the distinction. Paragraphs [10] through [21] elaborate (esp [13]). Thus an agent's original ultimate end is his supreme end as well. (?) Here is seems to be emphasizing by reiteration that this is the meaning of "end" in the title, "on the end for which God created the world".

[23] SIXTHLY, It may be further observed, that the original ultimate end or ends of the creation of the world is *alone*, that which induces God to give the occasion for consequential ends, by the first creation of the world, and the original disposal of it. And the more original the end is, the more extensive and universal it is. That which God had primarily in view in creating, and the original ordination of the

world, must be constantly kept in view, and have a governing influence in all God's works, or with respect to every thing he does towards his creatures.

The disposition that explains *why* God determines and pursues his purposes in creating the world is *the primal ground of all*. Even though all of God's dispositional attributes are everlastingly eternal, only this one grounds the beginning of his works in creating and subsequent achievements as means to his end. However, *as* he proceeds to enact his plan, other dispositions (e.g., his faithfulness and his justice) are "triggered" so to speak either by the existence of some subordinate end or circumstances or by his merely considering them as such.

[23] 6. [POSITION SIX] (Taking God's *motive* into consideration) The DISPOSITION that moved God to achieve his original ultimate end is the sole cause of every subordinate end and, therefore, governs all that God does.¹⁰ [23]

There are several items to note here in order to understand the import of [POSITION SIX]. First, Edwards is careful not to claim more than reason dictates regarding whether God has one original ultimate end or more than one. Second, we have an example of something Edwards may have corrected on closer inspection. He had been developing the distinction between an agent's ends and the dispositions which "cause" the agent to pursue those ends. Here however, he speaks as though an *end* is what causes God to act. Do "ends induce" to action or do "dispositions induce"? It looks as though he is inconsistent here. However, by his italicizing the word, '*alone*', it seems that his intention is to say something about God's motive here. But even this seems not quite all that should be said to overcome the apparent inconsistency, because he seems to be saying something about *how* God's original ultimate *end* governs (not merely motivates) everything he does along the way toward its achievement. Dispositions "move" the agent and such actions are rational rooted in a cognitive evaluation of the worth of a state to be achieved. So, in a derivative sense, it is not incorrect to speak as though ends induce to action. Furthermore, when this is "constantly kept in view", the other things he does and the dispositions that move him to achieve them will make sense. So, we have this fundamental principle of biblical interpretation and theological formulation:

6. [POSITION SIX] The DISPOSITION that moved God to achieve his original ultimate end is the sole cause of every subordinate end and, therefore, governs all that God does. [23]

And therefore,

[24] SEVENTHLY, If we use the phrase ultimate end in this highest sense, then the same that is God's ultimate end in creating the world, if we suppose but one such

¹⁰ $D\delta^d_{\Delta} \rightarrow \forall y (By \rightarrow D\delta^d y)$.

end, must be what he makes his ultimate aim in all his works, in every thing he does either in creation or providence. But we must suppose that in the use, which God puts his creatures to that he hath made, he must evermore have a regard to the end for which he has made them.¹¹ But if we take *ultimate end* in the other lower sense, God may sometimes have regard to those things as ultimate ends, in particular works of providence, which could not in any proper sense be his last end in creating the world.

Therefore (Taking God's *purpose* into consideration, on the one hand recognizing the difference between *original* and *consequential*)

7. [POSITION SEVEN]

(Part A) Bearing *original ultimate end* in mind, then if God has only one original ultimate end, then every subordinate end is a means to it, and every use to which God puts his creatures is a means to achieving his original ultimate end.¹² [24]

Part A seems mistaken and does not follow from what he has carefully established, because there is the possibility of a "branch" and therefore, a subordinate in the branch that is not subordinate to God's original ultimate end but only to a consequential ultimate end. This holds unless, every disposition is itself related to and governed by the primal disposition.

(Part B) Bearing *consequential ultimate end* in mind, some works of providence may be means to these and these cannot by their nature be God's original ultimate end in creation. [24]

[25] EIGHTHLY, On the other hand, whatever appears to be God's ultimate end in any sense, of his works of providence in general, that must be the ultimate end of the work of creation itself. For tho' it be so that God may act for an end, that is an ultimate end in a lower sense, in some of his works of providence, which is not the ultimate end of the creation of the world : Yet this does not take place with regard to the works of providence in general. But we may justly look upon whatsoever has the nature of an ultimate end of God's works of providence in general, that the same is also an ultimate end of the creation of the world ; for God's works of providence in general, are the same with the general use that he

¹¹ Difference between the *existence* of a creature and *God's use* of the creature. The *existence* is a subordinate end. *God's use* is also guided by his ultimate end of their existence.

¹² $O_{\Delta} \rightarrow \exists!x(Ox \rightarrow (\forall yBy \rightarrow Myx))$ or $(O_{\Delta} \wedge \sim \exists x(x=\Delta \wedge Gx) \rightarrow (\forall yBy \rightarrow Myx))$.

puts the world to that he has made. And we may well argue from what we see of the general use which God makes of the world, to the general end for which he designed the world. Tho' there may be some things that are ends of particular works of providence, that were not the last end of the creation, which are in themselves grateful to God in such particular emergent circumstances; and so are last ends in an inferior sense: Yet this is only in certain cases, or particular occasions. But if they are last ends of God's proceedings in the use of the world in general, this shows that his making them last ends does not depend on particular cases and circumstances, but the nature of things in general, and his general design in the being and constitution of the universe.

This proposition about how the previous one may be used to ascertain what God's ultimate end is. It is of epistemic value.

Taking God's purpose into consideration, on the other hand regardless of the difference,
8. [POSITION EIGHT] Whatever appears to be the ultimate end of God's works of providence in general is his ultimate end in creating the world. [25]

[26] NINTHLY, if there be but one thing that is originally, and independent on any future, supposed cases, agreeable to God, to be obtained by the creation of the world, then there can be but one last end of God's work, in this highest sense: But if there are various things, properly diverse one from another, that are absolutely and independently on the supposition of any future given cares, agreeable to the divine being, which are actually obtained by the creation of the world, then there were several ultimate ends of the creation, in that highest sense.

9. [POSITION NINE] If there is only one thing that God values intrinsically and God values it before anything was created, then there is only one original ultimate end AND if there are several things that God values intrinsically and God values them before anything was created, then there are several original ultimate ends.¹³ [26]

Everyone agreed that God is infinitely valuable. Edwards is drawing attention to the consequence that this was true before the creation of the world and entails that God is God's ultimate end and God's infinite self-love was the disposition that moved him to create and governs all that he does.

¹³ $\exists!x(Sx \wedge \forall x \wedge \sim \exists y Mxy \wedge \prec x) \rightarrow \exists!yOy) \wedge \exists\#x(Sx \wedge \forall x \wedge \sim \exists y Mxy \wedge \prec x) \rightarrow \exists\#yOy).$

Miscellaneous notes of *End of Creation*

The cognitive dimension is seldom mentioned specifically after [2] (“esteemed good for nothing”). Furthermore, it seems patently implicit, so it seems that the formalization should include it. However, unless specified by use of the term, ‘desires’, which denotes the affective/ passionate dimension, his use of the term, ‘value’s, seems to include *both* the cognitive / evaluative dimension as well as the affective / passionate dimension.

Edwards uses “S desires x” in two ways. To see how Edwards differentiates these, let us recall that to say that “S values x” can be taken in the *cognitive/evaluative* sense and in the *affective/passionate* sense. An agent can apprehend a thing’s actual value and esteem or desire it accordingly. Secondly, an agent can value (in these senses) something inherently or derivatively. So, sometimes he intends “desire” or “value” simply in the affective/passionate sense; sometimes in both the cognitive and affective senses. The *types* of things so valued are *usually* the *pleasure* of achieving some state of affairs σ . When the thing desired (cognitively and affectively) is the *pleasure* in something, such desiring is to be associated with and to signal the presence of (what we may call) a 1st order disposition. “S loves x” means S had a disposition to seek the achievement of σ so as to take pleasure in it. But at other times Edwards writes so that to say that S values x is just to assert that S has a disposition relevant to x. For example, in [18] he writes, “Thus, for instance : A man may originally love society. An inclination to society may be implanted in his very nature : And society may be agreeable to him antecedent to all presupposed cases and circumstances”. To “love society” is a disposition to enjoy social interaction. However, when what is valued (cognitively and affectively) is a *disposition*, such valuing is a 2nd order disposition. In other words, dispositions themselves can be appraised as being inherently valuable and can be esteemed as characteristics accordingly. It is an ever present and enduring trait of some agent that he or she values some characteristic. God values his dispositions as well as the achievement of his end in creation.

But also, for both types, *an agent S has a disposition which causes S to seek and occurrently to value it because of the gratification it provides means it is (dispositionally) agreeable to S.* (More formally, $Dx \leftrightarrow Ax$, where $A^1 = \textcircled{1}$ is (dispositionally) agreeable to S; S (dispositionally) values x.)

As he writes in [20] “. . .the agent’s desire of them (i.e., consequential ultimate ends), be consequential on the existence, or supposition of proper subjects and occasion . . .” Thus, consequential ultimate ends are defined by association with dispositions whose manifestations have three components. All three components make sense only in light of some actual or hypothetical circumstance triggering the disposition. Original ultimate ends, by contrast, are defined by association with dispositions whose manifestation involves only two.